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I.

INTRODUCTION

The fruits of the Human Genome Project (HGP) will soon
enable people to have simple tests that provide information about
their genetic propensities for various disorders, both mental and
physical. This new information could thus give people the ability to
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make important decisions related to their health; however, it could
also result in misinterpretation and misuse by others, such as
employers.
Ongoing legal and ethical debates suggest that
information about people’s genetic propensities could result in
discrimination, with commentators disagreeing over how effective
current jurisprudence is for preventing and/or remediating such
violations.
This debate begs fundamental questions that
psychological research could address, such as “Would employers
even utilize genetic information, should they gain access to it?”
This article reviews relevant literature on genetics and disability
discrimination and outlines some psycho-legal issues and avenues
for research.
II. GENETIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:
A PSYCHO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The desire to make inferences about human nature based on
biology is not without precedent or merit. History is rife with
examples of attempts to categorize and predict human diseases and
behaviors, both for good purposes (e.g., to improve health) and for
1
bad (e.g., eugenics, which sought to “weed out the weak”). The
Human Genome Project (HGP) is the newest in a series of
technological improvements that will allow us to persist in efforts to
improve ourselves. Proponents of the HGP argue that it will allow
us to identify the genetic mutations that cause disease and
2
unhealthiness and ultimately remedy those problems. However,
past experience demonstrates that we sometimes place more faith
in the conclusiveness and accuracy of our latest technology than is
3
warranted.
For example, during the eugenics movement of the early
twentieth century, people with low cognitive functioning were often
1. David L.Wiesenthal & Neil I. Wiener, Privacy and the Human Genome
Project, 6 ETHICS & BEHAV. 189 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins & Victor A. McKusick, Implications of the Human
Genome Project for Medical Science, 285 JAMA 540, 543-44 (2001); Florian Eckhardt et
al., Future Potential of the Human Epigenome Project, 4(5) EXPERT REV. OF MOLECULAR
DIAGNOSIS 609 (2004) (discussing epigenetics and its usefulness in diagnosing the
molecular basis of human diseases).
3. Sarah Cunningham-Burley & Mary Boulton, The Social Context of the New
Genetics, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL STUDIES IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 173, 174-75
(Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2000) (discussing a social context analysis of genetic
developments as well as a sociohistorical overview of the growth of genetics during
the twentieth century).
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sterilized because they were seen as incapable of caring for
children and their intellectual limitations were seen as unworthy
4
traits. Contradicting these assumptions, research from the latter
half of the twentieth century demonstrates that many people with
low cognitive functioning can raise children with the aid of social
5
support and skills training. For another example, males with an
extra Y chromosome (XYY chromosomes instead of XY
chromosomes) were argued to be more likely to be mentally ill,
6
aggressive and criminal; it is now recognized that many of the
studies leading to those conclusions suffered from bias in sampling
7
techniques, among other problems. Based on history, it seems
prudent to be cautious when interpreting new information that
purports to link heredity to behavioral outcomes in a conclusive
way, because two risks exist: (1) that the information will be
8
inaccurate or misinterpreted, or (2) that the information will be
accurate and understood, but misused.
Already, advances in our understanding of the genetic
9
precursors for heritable diseases have led to new genetic tests. For
example, one can now obtain a test for cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs
Disease, hereditary breast and colon cancer, coronary artery
disease, late-onset Alzheimer’s, bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis,

4. See J. David Smith & Edward A. Polloway, Institutionalization, Involuntary
Sterilization, and Mental Retardation: Profiles From the History of the Practice, 31 MENTAL
RETARDATION 208, 208 (1993) (discussing the legitimization of sterilization and
quoting Justice Holmes from Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)); Frederick E.
Kratter, Negative and Positive Eugenic Programs for Mental Defectives, 63 J. OF GEN.
PSYCHOL. 203, 204, 207-08 (1960) (advocating selective sterilization).
5. See, e.g., Maurice A. Feldman et al., Using Self-Instructional Pictorial Manuals
to Teach Child-Care Skills to Mothers With Intellectual Disabilities, 23 BEHAV.
MODIFICATION 480, 481 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Lissy F. Jarvik et al., Human Aggression and the Extra Y Chromosome:
Fact or Fantasy? 28 AM. PSYCHOL. 674, 675 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Nkanginieme Ike, Current Thinking on XYY Syndrome, 30
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 91, 92-93 (2000).
8. Richard S. Cooper, Race and IQ: Molecular Genetics as Deus ex Machina, 60
AM. PSYCHOL. 71 (2005); see generally Norman B. Anderson & Kim J. Nickerson,
Genes, Race, and Psychology in the Genome Era: An Introduction, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 5
(2005) (stating that with the advance of the HGP, the field needs to understand
the issues and implications of the research); Ainsley Newson, The Nature and
Significance of Behavioral Genetic Information, 25 THEORETICAL MED. 89 (2004)
(discussing how behavioral genetic information is distinguished from other
genetic information).
9. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho et al., Commercialization of BRCA1/2 Testing:
Practitioner Awareness and Use of a New Genetic Test, 83 AM. J. OF MED. GENETICS 157
(1999).
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Parkinson’s and schizophrenia—which are just some of the
10
Advances in genetic testing, as a result of new
available tests.
technological and scientific breakthroughs derived from the HGP,
may lead to a new form of employment discrimination based on
the perception of the increased likelihood of disease occurrence
from tests assessing genetic susceptibility. For example, employers
may be concerned about the future costs of an employee who has
tested positive on a genetic test. These perceived future costs could
take the form of lost time/absenteeism, lost productivity, higher
11
turnover, and expensive accommodations.
Employment
discrimination would follow if employers decided to control these
perceived future costs by not hiring people who tested positive for
disorders.
12
David Wiesenthal and Neil Wiener outline the way previous
scientific advances in understanding the biochemical nature of
humans has indeed been used to make biological and behavioral
inferences, often in a discriminating manner (such as the
aforementioned example of believing that having the chromosomal
abnormality XYY predicted pathologically violent behavior). They
predict that the likelihood of this type of genetic information
misuse is likely to continue in the new era of genetic information
13
availability. They also suggest that the pressure to make use of the
available information will become increasingly strong, citing the
“Law of the Hammer” which states, “[O]nce a tool is developed
14
there are considerable pressures for implementation.”
The wealth of general knowledge resulting from the HGP will
provide the opportunity for individualized health information to be
obtained through simple medical tests (e.g., blood tests) in a way
that will make the diagnostic information seem more concrete and
dispositive than previous technology. The air of determinism that
might be associated with the availability of this new type of health
information could have serious, deleterious consequences if it is
misinterpreted, over-interpreted, and/or misused (e.g., for
purposes of potentially unlawful discrimination).
10. Paula W. Yoon et al., Public Health Impact of Genetic Tests at the End of the 20th
Century, 3 GENETICS IN MED. 405, 405 (2001).
11. Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Genetic Discrimination and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Emerging Legal, Empirical,
and Policy Implications, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 411, 421 (1996).
12. See Wiesenthal & Wiener, supra note 1.
13. See id. at 196-98.
14. Id. at 196.
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The history of interpreting traits as being strongly determined
by heredity demonstrates our inability to account for
15
environmental influences that may alter outcomes. The reality is
that many genes operate according to a diathesis-stress model
whereby “disease” is not expressed unless an environmental stressor
“activates” the gene expression. For example, one may have a
genetic predisposition (the diathesis) for schizophrenia, but
whether or not a given person develops schizophrenia will depend
on many different environmental factors (the stressors) that could
16
bring it about. Thus, there are a number of considerations, aside
from the mere presence of a positive genetic test, that need to be
accounted for when one tries to interpret the risk of genetic
expression and make decisions (e.g., health-related behaviors or
hiring decisions) based on that interpretation. Incorrectly making
decisions about people’s propensities for genetic expression of
disorders could lead to unfair assumptions about their future
health and result in discriminatory treatment.
Concern about the misuse of health information and the
rights of ordinary citizens is warranted and not without precedent.
Employers have used a range of techniques varying in intrusiveness
to evaluate potential employees, from simple personality tests to
physiological tests (blood or urine) to rule out drug abuse. Case
law examples demonstrate that employers have been willing to use
permissible drug tests to obtain illegal information about medical
conditions of current and potential employees in making hiring
17
and dismissal decisions.
There is a heated debate in legal
literature regarding whether existing legislation would protect job
18
applicants and employees from genetic discrimination. However,
even if employers have permissible access to employees’ and
applicants’ medical information, decisions based on genetic tests
are unfounded to the degree that most of them currently offer no

15. See Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3, at 178.
16. See, e.g., Elaine F. Walker & Donald Diforio, Schizophrenia: A Neutral
Diathesis-Stress Model, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 667 (1997).
17. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th
Cir. 1998) (involving governmental employer who conditioned start of
employment upon a “health evaluation” that included testing for medical and
genetic information such as syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy).
18. Cynthia Nance et al., Discrimination in Employment on the Basis of Genetics:
Proceedings of the 2002 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on
Employment Discrimination Law, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 57 (2002) (Panel
discussion of existing legislation’s applicability to genetic discrimination).
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diagnostic value in the evaluation of future job performance. As
19
Blanck and Marti indicate, genetic precursors to a disease do not
necessarily confirm that a disease will arise in the future, much less
how severe the expression of the disease will be. Single gene
diseases are rare; the majority of diseases are explained by the
20
multiple interactions of several genes and the environment.
Furthermore, diseases have the potential to be ameliorated by a
number of environmental factors, such as behavior modification
(i.e., engaging in healthy activities) or medical treatment programs;
but employers, as well as medical professionals, may place an overemphasis on genetic predetermination and consequently ignore
21
environmental factors.
This article reviews literature relevant to the topic of genetic
information misinterpretation and misuse, particularly in the
employment context. More specifically, it will briefly review
relevant legislation and examples from case law of genetic and
22
Next, literature on people’s
health-based discrimination.
knowledge of the HGP, perceptions about testing, and genetic
23
discrimination will be reviewed.
Since there is little empirical
examination of actual genetic discrimination, the related literature
24
of disability discrimination will be briefly reviewed. The focus of
the article is the potential for use of genetic information in an
employment decision-making context; thus, consideration will be
given to the literature on how employers (or more often, potential
employers engaged in hiring) make decisions.
The article
culminates in a call for research that empirically examines whether
health-based information, such as genetic test results, would be
used by people making hiring decisions if they had access to it, as
well as for research examining the boundary conditions under
25
which such information would be used.

19.
20.

Blanck & Marti, supra note 11.
Joseph S. Alper, Genetic Complexity in Human Disease and Behavior, in THE
DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 17,
21 (Joseph S. Alper et al. eds., 2002).
21. Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3; supra text accompanying
note 14.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
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III. WHY STUDY THE POTENTIAL FOR GENETIC DISCRIMINATION—
LEGAL ISSUES AND EXAMPLES OF ACTUAL GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
A. Legislative and Judicial Response
The legal community has recognized the potential for genetic
26
discrimination in employment. Psycho-legal scholars believe that
there is insufficient legislation to protect against genetic
discrimination in employment. Legal scholars have not yet reached
a consensus. Some argue that legislation aimed specifically at the
27
problem of genetic discrimination,
and legislation aimed
28
generally at the problem of disability discrimination, should
29
address the potential problem of genetic discrimination. Other
30
legal scholars disagree about the adequacy of the legislation, as
31
Executive Order 13,145 applies only to federal employees and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not explicitly cover
presymptomatic individuals, such as those with a genetic
predisposition but not yet a full-blown disorder.

26. E.g., Wiesenthal & Wiener, supra note 1; Yoon et al., supra note 10; Blanck
& Marti, supra note 11; Nance et al., supra note 18.
27. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000); National
Human Genome Research Institute, Policy and Legislation Database,
http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm (containing
various state laws passed specifically to deal with genetic discrimination). See
Benjamin V. Carnovale & Mark S. Clanton, Genetic Testing: Issues Related to Privacy,
Employment and Health Insurance, 10 CANCER PRACTICE 102, 102-04 (2002) (noting
that even though state legislation addresses the impermissibility of requesting
genetic tests it is not clear whether requesting information about prior genetic
tests is prohibited).
28. E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213
(2000).
29. See, e.g., Paul S. Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 189 (1998) (discussing the fears of genetic discrimination and the existing
case law and legislation in place to accommodate it); Paul S. Miller, Is There a Pink
Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
225 (2000) (discussing the fears of genetic discrimination, genetic privacy, and the
existing case law and legislation in place to accommodate both, including an
executive order by the President).
30. See, e.g., Peter D. Blanck & Mollie W. Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345
(1997) (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act and its effects since
implementation); Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?,
29 AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2003) (discussing the differences between genetic
discrimination and other discrimination and whether genetic discrimination is
especially derogating).
31. Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
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Indeed, recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have
interpreted the ADA in a way that some critics consider narrow and
likely to substantially limit plaintiffs’ ability to bring actions. For
example, in one trilogy of cases, the Court made it clear that if a
plaintiff has taken action to mitigate a disability, then such
mitigation is to be considered by the courts, and the courts can
reasonably conclude that plaintiffs are not “substantially limited in
32
a major life activity.” This would then mean that they are not
33
disabled under the ADA. Yet another trilogy of recent cases from
the Supreme Court has continued in the same vein of making it
difficult for plaintiffs to bring and succeed with ADA claims, either
by showing (1) they have a disability within the meaning of the
34
ADA, (2) their request for reasonable accommodation should not
35
be subordinate to employer policies, or (3) their employer is
36
using their own disability against them.
These rulings, and others by the Supreme Court, have served
to limit the applicable scope of the ADA and suggest that the Court
may be reticent to recognize the applicability of the Act to genetic

32. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The ADA and the Workplace: A Study of the Supreme
Court’s Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379, 401 (2004)
(quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)).
33. See, e.g., Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1999)
(holding that a plaintiff with amblyopia fired for not meeting Department of
Transportation vision standards was not disabled by his condition since his visual
system provided mitigation by allowing him to see with one eye whereas others
typically see with two eyes); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516,
523 (1999) (holding that a plaintiff with hypertension who was denied a position
driving a commercial vehicle for UPS because he failed Department of
Transportation certification standards, regarding high blood pressure, was not
disabled since medication controlled the condition); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 493 (1999) (holding that plaintiffs who were denied
commercial airline pilot positions and who had myopia that could be corrected
with lenses were not disabled).
34. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002)
(holding that a plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who, among other things,
could not always dress herself and had to limit time spent with her children was
not sufficiently restricted in major life activities so as to be disabled).
35. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 424 (2002) (holding it
acceptable for an employer’s seniority rules to permit other employees to bid for a
position that the plaintiff had obtained using his seniority rights to accommodate
his injury).
36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 87 (2002) (holding that it
was not impermissible discriminatory action for a contractor to lay off an
employee whose condition made it likely that working for the contractor’s
employer in the employer’s refinery would expose the plaintiff to toxins
exacerbating the plaintiff’s health condition).
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discrimination. However, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (E.E.O.C.) has interpreted the ADA to apply to
genetic discrimination, so the potential for courts to adopt this
interpretation and apply the ADA to presymptomatic individuals
37
exists—although it seems unlikely that courts will do so,
particularly considering the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
demonstrating that the E.E.O.C.’s interpretations of the ADA will
not necessarily be followed. What is apparent is that the problem
of genetic discrimination has been recognized and that the
adequacy, or inadequacy, of remedies is being debated.
Aside from legislation that provides a basis for filing actions
after discrimination is alleged to occur, there is the potential for
existing legislation to provide protections that prevent genetic
38
information from being acquired in the first place. For example,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
protects the privacy of medical information and prevents disclosure
39
of medical information without the patient’s consent. However,
the adequacy of its protections is still being tested, and some
suggest that there are those who may nonetheless avoid predictive
testing because of a fear that results will fall into the hands of those
40
who would use the information discriminatorily. Indeed, during
hearings related to the reauthorization of the 1996 amendments to
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), panelists raised concerns
that medical information that could be obtained via credit reports
41
or thorough background checks may not be covered by HIPAA.
In addition, there are legitimate ways that employers can gain
access to employee or applicant medical information. One of the
most obvious ways is through direct testing of biological materials
voluntarily turned over by employees (e.g., blood or urine).
Employees will submit to testing when company policy or law
37. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that ADA safeguards protecting information on job
applicant’s medical condition or history are adequate); see also Americans with
Disabilities Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2000).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2000).
39. Id.
40. HIPAA Medical Privacy and Transition Rules: Overkill or Overdue? Hearing
Before the S. Spec. Comm. On Aging, 108th Cong. 95-97 (2004) (statement of Janlori
Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project).
41. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, SUMMARY OF HEARING ON “THE ROLE OF FCRA
IN EMPLOYEE BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE COLLECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION”
1 (2003), http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-url_nocat2303/info-url_nocat_show.
htm?doc_id=177534.
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requires it, as in the case of drug testing conducted on employees.
Drug testing has been upheld by the Supreme Court as permissible
so long as it is reasonable and there is a “special need,” such as
when Customs Officers are being promoted to positions where they
42
may intercept illegal drug transportation, or when public safety
43
demands it as with the case of drug testing railway employees.
Acquiescence to permissible testing does not, however, mean
that further testing of the biological materials is necessarily
44
allowed.
Such further testing would include genetic testing,
which is a separate issue and governed by different legal principles.
One example of permissible genetic testing involves chemical
sensitivity.
For example, employers in industries involving
45
exposure to beryllium may monitor groups of employees via
genetic testing to make sure that exposure to beryllium will not be
46
a health problem for the employees, and that the chemical
47
In the majority of situations,
exposure is not harming them.
however, genetic monitoring and/or testing is impermissible, as
when employers exceed the scope of permission they have been
given by employees for testing (e.g., testing for something other
48
than drugs or chemical sensitivities). Such impermissible testing
can then predicate employment discrimination by leading to
decisions not to hire, to fire, or not to promote a given employee
based on the results of the impermissible tests.
42. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(holding that Customs Service did not need a warrant to conduct a drug testing
requirement).
43. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
44. See Brian Bornstein, Seize This Urine Test: The Implications of Ferguson v.
City of Charleston for Drug Testing During Pregnancy, 6 J. MED. & L. 65 (2001)
(discussing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), which ruled that
urine tests were searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that
the tests, along with subsequent reporting of positive results to the police, were
unreasonable searches absent patients’ consent).
45. Beryllium is a lightweight metal to which some people have a genetic
sensitivity. Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949,
966 n.79 (2001).
46. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002); NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1998).
47. Marisa Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right
to Privacy v. Employer’s Need to Know, 39 AM. BUS. L. J. 139, 169-70 (2001)
(explaining that the Occupation Health and Safety Administration requires an
employer to protect employees from hazardous chemicals and that employers may
perform blood tests to determine whether an employee is absorbing harmful levels
of a chemical).
48. See Bornstein, supra note 44.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/12

10

Adya and Bornstein: Genetic Information and Discrimination in Employment: A Psycho-le
8ADYA_PAGINATED.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 9:56:02 AM

GENETIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION

275

B. Actual Genetic/Health-Based Discrimination—Examples and
Survey Data
In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, employees of
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory sued their employer, because they
found out that blood and urine samples voluntarily submitted
during standard preemployment and postemployment health
exams had been tested for sickle cell anemia, pregnancy, and
49
syphilis. According to the district court, by submitting to routine
medical exams, and answering questions about such diseases on a
medical history form, the employees had given permission to test
50
for such traits.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that
submission to routine medical exams does not per se amount to
51
submission for genetic and pregnancy testing.
In another case, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (E.E.O.C.) sued the Burlington Northern and Santa
Fe Railroad Company after employees found out they were being
52
genetically tested for a carpal tunnel syndrome marker.
The
company was trying to determine which employees would be likely
to suffer from repetitive stress injuries, which were becoming a
53
financial burden for the company. The complaint alleged that
Burlington Northern even retaliated against employees who
54
refused to submit to genetic testing.
The company ultimately
55
agreed to settle out of court.
Other anecdotal evidence exists in the form of survey studies
of patients or workers, which have more pointedly explored the
56
issue of perceived discrimination. Geller et al. conducted a survey
through national organizations, which included respondents who
were
at
risk,
presymptomatic,
or
asymptomatic
for
hemochromatosis,
phenylketonuria,
mucopolysaccharidosis

49. 135 F.3d at 1265.
50. Id. at 1266.
51. Id. at 1269.
52. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., No. 02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002).
53. Id. at *1.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *2.
56. Lisa Geller et al., Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic
Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, in THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 247 (2002); E. Virginia Lapham,
Chahira Kozma & Joan O. Weiss, Genetic Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers,
274 SCI. 621 (1996).
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57

disorders, and Huntington disease.
An initial mailed survey
screened for people who reported perceived discrimination, and
follow-up interviews were then conducted with that subsample; of
58
the 917 mailed surveys, 206 people were chosen to be interviewed.
Respondents identified the institutions that had discriminated
against them as health and life insurers, clinical professionals,
employers, blood banks, and public institutions, such as the
59
government and military.
In addition to asking who was discriminatory, and how, people
were also asked to indicate if they had taken any steps to avoid
60
discrimination.
Respondents voiced concerns about the
61
possibility of discrimination in both hiring and firing.
Some
respondents also reported that they refused to accept more
desirable jobs or relocate for new jobs fearing that health insurance
62
would be unobtainable in the new job. Thus, although employers
may not be listed as the most discriminatory, they are clearly linked
to the group (insurers) that is perceived as the most discriminatory;
and any discriminatory actions by insurers could affect actions
taken by employers.
In order to avoid discrimination, many of the respondents to
the Geller et al. survey reported taking various actions that gave
them a sense of control over the situation and their genetic
63
information.
They obtained insurance prior to any genetic
testing, received testing that could not be linked back to them
personally, only partially disclosed relevant information, and
personally paid for testing that would ordinarily be covered by
insurers (to avoid results of the test falling into the insurers’
64
hands). Thus, they not only took passive control (avoidance of
testing), but active control as well.
Lapham et al. found results very similar to those of Geller et
65
al. They also surveyed members of support groups, specifically
those who were affiliated with the Alliance of Genetic Support
Groups, and had a total of 332 respondents. They found that 25%
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Geller et al., supra note 56, at 250-52.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252, 257.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Lapham, Kozma & Weiss, supra note 56; Geller et al., supra note 56.
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of their sample believed they were denied life insurance, 22%
believed they were denied health insurance, and 13% believed they
were not hired or were fired all because of their genetic status or
that of a family member. They also found that in order to avoid
being discriminated against, people took steps such as avoiding
testing (89%) or keeping information from insurers and employers
(80%).
Survey data, anecdotal evidence, and some case law suggest
that genetic discrimination has already occurred. These sources
also suggest that both employees and employers have some
awareness of the existence of technologies like genetic testing and
the HGP. The next section reviews data on the extent to which
laypeople are, in fact, familiar with these concepts.

IV. CURRENT AWARENESS OF THE HGP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:
PERCEPTIONS OF TESTING
The degree to which people are even aware of the availability
of genetic information could affect its use or the perception that
such information is being used. How aware are people of the
HGP? How aware are people that genetic tests could be used to
diagnose their potential for disorders? How aware are people that
such information could be used against them, and if they are aware
of the potential, how fearful are they? All these questions bear
examination.
A. Awareness of the HGP
Poll data demonstrate that most people indeed are aware of
the HGP and the concept of genetic testing. In fall 2001, Virginia
Commonwealth University conducted a poll of United States
adults, finding that of the 1122 respondents, roughly half were
66
aware of the HGP.
67
A June 2002 Harris Interactive poll asked several questions

66. Va. Commonwealth Univ., Life Sciences Survey, http://roperweb.
ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/HPOLL/StateId/
CqdoZIwcOV0TRW4ZcUBYOFue1VhLm-3XHL/HAHTpage/study_link?STDY_
ID=23719 (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
67. HUMPHREY TAYLOR, IF GENETIC TESTS WERE AVAILABLE FOR DISEASES WHICH
COULD BE TREATED OR PREVENTED, MANY PEOPLE WOULD PAY TO HAVE THEM (2002),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.Asp?PID=304.
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about genetics; of 1013 respondents, 70% indicated that they were
“somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” with the meaning of genetic
testing, and 81% believed it was a “good thing” to be able to use
such testing to find out which diseases people were at high risk of
getting. In order to find out such information, of course, people
would need access to someone in the medical field who could
conduct such testing; 90% of Harris poll respondents indicated
that they would feel comfortable with their regular doctor knowing
genetic information about them. Interestingly, only 25% of those
polled would want their life insurance company to have access to
genetic information, 39% would allow their health insurance
company access, and only 17% of those polled would want their
employer (who would usually be paying for part of the health
insurance and, thus, technically have access to such information) to
have access to the results of genetic tests.
A poll analysis conducted by the Gallup Organization showed
that “most” Americans did not want their genetic information to
68
get into the hands of employers or insurers. Both the Harris and
Gallup polls demonstrated that most people do not want employers
to have access to genetic information; it was unclear if this desire is
due to a fear that the information will result in discrimination, but
the data is certainly consistent with that notion.
B. Perceptions of Testing
69

Cunningham-Burley and Boulton approached the issue of
using genetic information from a different angle. By examining
the lay response to new genetic technology, such as the ability to
screen for various genetic predispositions to disease, they found
that people were slow to incorporate the new technologies into
their lives by making use of the screenings. One reason posited for
this finding was that people want to avoid the psychological
consequences of “knowing”; in other words, people may fear
having to live with the knowledge that they could become
symptomatic, so they engage in avoidant behavior.
If this
assumption is true, it means that people place a lot of weight on the
predictive power of a genetic test. In a hiring context, this means
that an employer might be as likely to discriminate against a person
68. Id.
69. Cunningham-Burley & Boulton, supra note 3, at 179-80.
Wiesenthal, supra note 1, with Alper, supra note 20.
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with a predisposition for a disability as she would be to discriminate
against a person with an actual disability.
The medical, genetic therapy, and genetic counseling
literature presents examples of patients’ fear of genetic testing. In
a survey of physicians who had requested information on a genetic
70
test for breast cancer, Cho et al. found that 70% of physicians who
offered the genetic test had at least one patient who refused to take
it. The physicians reported that 68% of patients declining the test
did so out of fear that confidentiality would not be maintained,
52% feared the actual results of the test, and 42% did not think
they could afford it.
71
In a review of the literature on genetic testing, Lerman et al.
examined three different types of genetic testing: prenatal genetic
testing (which tests the fetus), carrier testing (which tests parents
for autosomal recessive traits that require the “defective” gene to be
inherited from both parents in order for the trait to be expressed),
and predictive genetic testing (which focuses on the participant’s
own risk). They concluded that, although research did not reveal
broad adverse psychological effects of choosing to have tests,
subgroups of people with certain psychological traits appeared to
be more vulnerable to psychological stress than others. For
example, they found that women with “information-seeking”
coping styles were more susceptible to negative effects in some
situations. Indeed, research seems to be moving toward identifying
vulnerable subgroups rather than focusing on the possibility that
everyone who considers genetic testing may be adversely affected;
for example, the Multidimensional Impact of Cancer Risk
Assessment (MICRA) identifies subgroups of people who choose to
be genetically tested for cancer risk and may be vulnerable to
72
psychological distress after learning their test results.
Yet another complicating factor of the use of predictive
genetic test information by applicants, employees, or employers
73
involves the effect of individual difference variables like gender.
70. Cho et al., supra note 9, at 160.
71. Caryn Lerman et al., Genetic Testing: Psychological Aspects and Implications,
70 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 784 (2002).
72. David Cella & Chanita Hughes, A Brief Assessment of Concerns Associated with
Genetic Testing for Cancer: The Multidimensional Impact of Cancer Risk Assessment
(MICRA) Questionnaire, 21 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 564 (2002).
73. Miller, supra note 29, at 191 (regarding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
“genetic discrimination may have a disparate impact based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin”).
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Two studies have indicated a potential gender effect. Harman
examined attitudes about the use of genetic information and
genetic engineering, finding that women were less likely than men
to want genetic tests and enhancements.
Napolitano and
75
Ogunseitan found similar results when examining gender
differences in attitudes toward genetic engineering in the area of
reproduction. They replicated Harman’s findings that women are
more cautious than men, with women less accepting of genetic
engineering as a legitimate way to alter characteristics of unborn
children in utero. This suggests that gender may be a moderating
variable that affects the interpretation and use of genetic
information. Thus, male employees might be more likely than
female employees to submit to genetic testing. From an employer’s
perspective, men making hiring decisions might react differently
than women to applicants who have tested positive for a genetic
predisposition to disease.
Research examining genetic
discrimination, perceived and actual, would benefit from
moderating analyses that examine gender and other individual
difference variables.
In an examination of participants’ reasons for and against
76
genetic testing, Wroe et al investigated in more detail how people
felt about taking genetic tests. More specifically, they asked
participants to predict their likelihood of developing given
diseases, the likelihood that they would take genetic tests for those
diseases, and the reasons for their decisions. Despite being given
77
population base rates (e.g., “4% of people develop Disease X”)
for various diseases, all participants overestimated their risk of
78
developing diseases.
Students reported likelihoods of having
genetic tests from 28% to 62% for a variety of diseases, reflecting
79
the ratio between the pros and cons that they listed. Diseases that
student participants were more likely to obtain genetic tests for

74. Laurinda Beebe Harman, Attitudes About the Use of Genetic Information and
Genetic Engineering When Making Reproductive Decisions: Influence of Gender, Discipline
and Role, 55 (8-B) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 3122 (1995).
75. Carol L. Napolitano & Oladele A. Ogunseitan, Gender Differences in the
Perception of Genetic Engineering Applied to Human Reproduction, 46 SOC. INDICATORS
RES. 191 (1999).
76. Abigail L. Wroe et al., The Prospect of Predictive Testing for Personal Risk:
Attitudes and Decision Making, 36 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 599 (1998).
77. Id. at 605-06.
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id. at 607-09.
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included diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, heart disease, weak bones,
and breast cancer (with likelihoods greater than 50%), and diseases
that student participants were less likely to obtain genetic tests for
included colon cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia
80
(with likelihoods of less than 50%).
Another group of
participants, one that identified itself as having contemplated
genetic testing in the past, reported higher likelihoods of obtaining
genetic tests, ranging from 56% to 84% across a variety of
81
diseases.
The predictability of one’s likelihood to take a genetic test,
however, is more complex than this account indicates. In a review
of decision-making studies dealing with genetic risks and tests,
82
Shiloh presented many examples of contradictory findings.
Decisions varied according to several factors, including when the
studies were conducted; how the risk was presented to participants;
how researchers operationalized or framed the “decision” that
participants had to make; and who was asked to make the decision
about genetic tests (e.g., patients versus parents, spouses, families,
83
and different cultural groups). It has been shown that one’s role
84
affects one’s perspective when making decisions, as does
85
framing.
Additional research suggests that certainty in the
86
predictability of genetic tests is important, as is the control one
87
has over the progression of the disease at issue. Clearly, the
picture is a complex one, and findings need to be interpreted
within the context of how the research was conducted.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 608.
Id. at 609.
Shoshana Shiloh, Decision-Making in the Context of Genetic Risk, in THE
TROUBLED HELIX: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HUMAN
GENETICS 82 (Theresa Marteau & Martin Richards eds., 1996).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Willem A. Wagenaar & Gideon B. Keren, The Seat Belt Paradox:
Effect of Adopted Roles on Information Seeking, 38(1) ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1 (1986).
85. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000); HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2004).
86. See generally Bettina Meiser et al., Implications of Genetic Risk Information in
Families with a High Density of Bipolar Disorder: An Exploratory Study, 60(1) SOC. SCI. &
MED. 109. (2004); Shoshana Shiloh et al., Effects of Controllability, Predictability, and
Information-Seeking Style on Interest in Predictive Genetic Testing, 25(10) PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1187 (1999).
87. See generally Shiloh, supra note 82.
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V. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON DISABILITY AND DISCRIMINATION
Psycho-legal writers have convincingly demonstrated the
potential for genetic discrimination; however, experimental
examination of the phenomenon is lacking. In order to better
understand how genetic test information might be used
discriminatorily, it is instructive to look at the related literature on
discrimination due to disability. This well-developed body of
literature not only shows how discrimination occurs, but also
suggests important variables to consider and methodologies to use
in the study of discrimination.
Statistical data suggests that the disabled are treated
inequitably in the job market, as evidenced by a comparison of the
employment and pay rates of disabled and non-disabled
individuals. The salaries of the working disabled are up to 35%
88
lower than those who are in the same jobs and not disabled.
According to the Department of Labor, the disparity is caused in
large part by employers’ stereotypes and attitudes toward the
89
disabled and by employers’ expectations that disabled employees
will contribute to higher bottom-line costs with absenteeism,
90
poorer performance, turnover, accommodation necessities, lower
91
productivity, and higher workers’ compensation rates. Based on
the aforementioned concerns, it would seem that employers take
two different measures to combat the supposed higher costs of
employing disabled people: not hiring the disabled in the first
place or paying them less.
92
According to Stone and Colella, perception of disabled
people begins with their immediate categorization. Categories
automatically bring to mind stereotypes of the disabled and
93
associated expectancies with those stereotypes.
For example,

88. Dianna L. Stone & Adrienne Colella, A Model of Factors Affecting the
Treatment of Disabled Individuals in Organizations, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 352, 352
(1996) (citing FRANK BOWE, ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES: A PORTRAIT (1992)).
89. David Braddock & Lynn Bachelder, The Glass Ceiling and Persons with
Disabilities, 56 PUB. POL’Y MONOGRAPH SERIES 1 (1994).
90. Stone & Colella, supra note 88, at 352-53 (citing DAVID BRADDOCK & LYNN
BACHELDER, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (1994)).
91. See also Dale R. Fuqua et al., A Comparison of Employer Attitudes Toward the
Worker Problems of Eight Types of Disabled Workers, 15 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING
40, 41 (1984) (discussing employer attitudes towards productivity, accident rates,
and worker compensation problems).
92. Stone & Colella, supra note 88, at 358.
93. Id.
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94

Fichten and Amsel found that the physically disabled are
perceived as “quiet, honest, gentle hearted, non-egotistical,
benevolent, helpless, hypersensitive, inferior, depressed, distant,
shy, unappealing, unsociable, bitter, nervous, unaggressive,
insecure, dependent, unhappy, aloof, and submissive” more often
than non-disabled people.
Despite these broad stereotypes, not all disabilities are viewed
in the same way. The majority of the evidence appears to
demonstrate that sensory disabilities (e.g., blindness and deafness)
and cognitive disabilities (e.g., mental retardation and mental
95
illness) are viewed less favorably than physical disabilities.
It has been suggested that the reason for the difference in how
sensory and cognitive impairments are viewed, as compared to
physical impairments, lies in the fact that physical impairments are
96
seen as more consistent and predictable over time.
Following
from that, it may be that genetic tests that are positive for mental
disabilities may also be seen as less stable and predictable than
genetic tests that are positive for physical disabilities. Conversely, if
people are attuned to the fact that genetic tests are not
determinative, then they may see positive genetic tests for any
disorder as analogous to an actual mental disability: unstable over
time and unpredictable.
Research examining disabled people in the workplace has not
just looked at whether disabled people are perceived differently, but
also whether they are treated differently. Analog research models

94. Id. (citing Catherine S. Fichten & Rhonda Amsel, Trait Attributions about
College Students with a Physical Disability: Circumplex Analyses and Methodological Issues,
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., 16:410-27 (1986)).
95. James E. Bordieri & David E. Drehmer, Hiring Decisions for Disabled
Workers: Looking at the Cause, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 204 (1986) (finding
that potential employers viewed job applicants with paraplegia more favorably
than applicants with drug-related problems); David E. Drehmer & James E.
Bordieri, Hiring Decisions for Disabled Workers: The Hidden Bias, 30 REHAB. PSYCHOL.
157, 157 (1985) (finding that potential employers viewed job applicants with a
history of mental illness less favorably than applicants with paraplegia); Fuqua et
al., supra note 91, at 41-42 (finding that potential employers favored epileptics and
amputees over the blind and mentally retarded.); Jean-Francois Ravaud et al.,
Discrimination Towards Disabled People Seeking Employment, 35 SOC. SCI. MED. 951
(1992) (finding that potential employers viewed job applicants with paraplegia less
favorably than applicants without paraplegia). But see Bradford S. Bell &
Katherine J. Klein, Effects of Disability, Gender, and Job Level on Ratings of Job
Applicants, 46 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 229, 238-39 (2001) (finding bias in favor of job
applicants with disabilities).
96. Fuqua, supra note 91, at 41.
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have determined that disabled applicants receive fewer callbacks
97
98
for interviews, less favorable hiring recommendations, lower
99
salary recommendations, and that they are generally rated lower
than non-disabled applicants along a variety of dimensions such as
100
competence. Consistent with the stereotype research, individuals
with physical disabilities are discriminated against less in the
employment context than those with mental or neurological
101
102
disabilities.
In 1979, Rose and Brief examined the differences
in hiring rates and other employment-related treatment between
epileptics and the physically disabled (e.g., paraplegics and
amputees). They found that amputees were offered lower salaries
than non-disabled people and that epileptics were offered lower
103
salaries than the amputees. Stone and Sawatzki compared groups
of applicants who were non-disabled, physically disabled, and
psychiatrically disabled. They found no differences between the
non-disabled and physically disabled in terms of the probability of
being hired, but they did find that the group of applicants with
psychiatric disabilities fared worse. This result has been replicated
104
elsewhere and occurs even when participants rate the physically
105
and mentally disabled as having equivalent work qualifications.
In general, unfavorable information about a job applicant is given
106
greater weight than other information, and it appears that a
disability is clearly perceived as unfavorable information.
Disabilities, along with ethnicity and gender, are one of the
97. Ravaud et al., supra note 95, at 954.
98. Christopher I. Stone & Birgit Sawatzki, Hiring Bias and the Disabled
Interviewee: Effects of Manipulating Work History and Disability Information of the
Disabled Job Applicant, 16 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 96, 101 (1980).
99. Gerald L. Rose & Arthur P. Brief, Effects of Handicap and Job Characteristics
on Selection Evaluations, 32 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 385, 388-89 (1979).
100. Bell & Klein, supra note 95.
101. See generally Stone & Colella, supra note 90.
102. Rose & Brief, supra note 99.
103. Stone & Sawatzki, supra note 98.
104. See, e.g., William Drew Gouvier et al., Employment Discrimination Against
Handicapped Job Candidates: An Analog Study of the Effects of Neurological Causation,
Visibility of Handicap, and Public Contact, 36 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 121 (1991)
(discussing employer perceptions of disabled potential employees); Linda T.
Thomas & James E. Thomas, The Effects of Handicap, Sex, and Competence On Expected
Performance, Hiring and Salary Recommendations, 16 J. APPLIED REHABILITATION
COUNSELING 19 (1985) (discussing current trends in employer attitudes towards
hiring).
105. Bordieri & Drehmer, supra note 95.
106. Patricia M. Rowe, Decision Processes in Personnel Selection, 16 CAN. J. BEHAV.
SCI. 326 (1984) (reviewing research on decision-making in personnel selection).
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107

“stigmas in organizations.”
The literature on disability discrimination is instructive
because people may perceive a positive genetic test (i.e., the
potential for disability) to be “as good as” having a disability. The
literature on perceptions of predictive genetic testing and the
likelihood of having genetic tests indicates that this may be the
case, since fear of the results suggests an overly deterministic
interpretation of a positive genetic test.
Thus, if genetic
information is given great weight, it could lead to discrimination
against people with positive results by operating much the same
way that having an actual disability does. It would be interesting to
see how closely the perceptions match by determining whether a
person with a positive genetic test for higher risk of a mental
disability (e.g., depression) is discriminated against more often
than a person with a positive genetic test for higher risk of a
physical disability (e.g., carpal tunnel syndrome). Such a finding
would show that people perceive the potential for different
disabilities in the same way they perceive actual different
disabilities.
Thus, if one has the option of hiring someone who has tested
positive for high risk of a disease over someone who has not tested
positive—and the person who has tested positive is equally qualified
for the job—it seems likely that the person who did not test positive
would be hired. In such a case, the hiring decision would be
discriminatory.
Should it be demonstrated that such
discriminatory decisions are made, the calls for legislation
protecting those who test positive for genetic disorders would have
more force than they do currently, in the absence of research.
VI. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: WHAT DO PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
HAVE TO OFFER?
Clearly, the bulk of the literature supports the notion that
genetic discrimination is a potential problem.
What can
psychology and law offer to address this problem? “Social analytic
jurisprudence” provides a framework for studying the interaction of

107. Eugene F. Stone et al., Stigmas in Organizations: Race, Handicaps, and
Physical
Unattractiveness,
in
ISSUES,
THEORY,
AND
RESEARCH
IN
INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 385 (Kathryn Kelley ed., North-Holland
1992).
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108

law and social science, especially psychology,
which can be
applied to the topic of genetic discrimination. The first stage in
the approach is analysis of doctrine, policy rules, or legal
procedures, carefully looking for assumptions that the law makes
about human behavior. With respect to genetic discrimination,
there are clear indications of concern that employers could misuse
109
genetic information if it is available.
The second stage of social analytic jurisprudence is a careful
psychological analysis of law and policy, in which the psycho-legal
scholar identifies the theories, research results, and methodologies
110
that are most suitable to answer legal and policy questions.
Research documenting the consistency with which genetic
discrimination could occur can serve as the foundation upon which
arguments for preventative or punitive legislation are made. The
employee selection and disability discrimination literature contains
numerous examples of analog research in which participants
simulate the task of employers in making decisions such as hiring
111
and salary recommendations. This methodology, which provides
a means of systematically investigating the impact of relevant
variables (e.g., type of disability) in a controlled fashion, yields
112
results that comport well with those of more naturalistic studies.
It could easily be adapted to the study of genetic discrimination by
incorporating a predisposition for a disability (i.e., a positive genetic
test) instead of an actual disability.

108. Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do
Workers Know When It Is Harassment and When It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1997)
[hereinafter Social Sexual Conduct] (discussing the psychological implications of
hostile work environment law); Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How Do People
Evaluate Social-Sexual Conduct at Work?: A Psycholegal Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
75 (2000) (evaluating social sexual conduct complaints with reasonable person
and reasonable woman legal standard); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Fit and
Implementation of Sexual Harassment Law to Workplace Evaluations, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 747 (2002) (examining legal standards on the evaluation of social-sexual
conduct at work); Richard L. Wiener et al., The Effects of Prior Workplace Behavior on
Subsequent Sexual Harassment Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47 (2004) (testing
dual processing model of sexual harassment judgments).
109. E.g., Walker & Diforio, supra note 16; Yoon, supra note 10.
110. Social Sexual Conduct, supra note 108, at 55.
111. E.g., Bell & Klein, supra note 95; Bordieri & Drehmer, supra note 95;
Michael A. Hitt & Steven H. Barr, Managerial Selection Decision Models: Examination
of Configural Cue Processing, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 53 (1989) (evaluating hiring
possibilities based on age, sex, race, education, and experience); Rose & Brief,
supra note 99; Stone & Sawatzki, supra note 98.
112. Ravaud et al., supra note 95.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/12

22

Adya and Bornstein: Genetic Information and Discrimination in Employment: A Psycho-le
8ADYA_PAGINATED.DOC

2005]

11/17/2005 9:56:02 AM

GENETIC INFORMATION AND DISCRIMINATION

287

The disability discrimination literature generally follows the
analog paradigm in which student samples are given descriptions of
jobs and told that their task is to review applicant material and
select someone for the position. Factors such as the disability of
the applicant, the nature of the disability, and the nature of the job
are frequently manipulated variables.
There are, however, examples of studies on disability
discrimination that are notable for being more realistically
113
designed. Ravaud et al. conducted a field study in which a
representative, stratified sample of 2228 French companies’
different branches were mailed application materials.
The
researchers manipulated the type of disability, as well as the job
qualification of the applicants, and their dependent measure was
the number of callbacks for interviews that the applicants received.
When analyzing their results in a weighted manner such that
company size was accounted for, they found that disability did have
a negative effect on the number of callbacks received and that
larger companies discriminated more than smaller companies.
Thus, both analog and field studies demonstrate discrimination
toward people with disabilities.
The third stage of social analytic jurisprudence follows directly
from the first two. A psycho-legal analysis of the knowledge base
related to an area of law or public policy, such as genetic
discrimination and the HGP, is likely to point out gaps in our
understanding of the psychological and social realities that
underlie legal assumptions. “In the third stage of social analytic
jurisprudence, psycho-legal scholars conduct research that tests the
psychological . . . models that they applied to answer the empirical
114
issues identified in stages 1 and 2.” It is at this stage that the topic
of genetic discrimination affords numerous empirical avenues. For
example, to what extent do employers rely on genetic information?
How do they use this information relative to other health
information (e.g., family history) or job-relevant information (e.g.,
work experience)? Is the information used more in some types of
employment decisions than others (e.g., hiring decisions versus.
post-hiring decisions like personnel evaluations)? Does reliance on
genetic information vary as a function of individual characteristics
(e.g., decision makers’ race, gender, or job position), company

113.
114.

See id.
Social Sexual Conduct, supra note 108, at 72.
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characteristics (e.g., size), or type of genetic information (e.g.,
predisposition for a mental versus. a physical disability)? Do
organizational policies effectively prevent the use of such
information when salient? Experimental psychological research
that manipulates some of these variables within a simulated
employment context could provide a wealth of information on
whether legal assumptions about genetic discrimination are
warranted.
In addition to influencing policy, social science research on
115
the law can measure law’s impact on the behavior of citizens.
If
116
people fear—as research suggests they do —that employers and
others would use the results of such screenings to discriminate
against them, they might avoid predictive screening (and thus miss
the opportunity for early diagnosis and treatment) altogether,
117
which it has been suggested might occur
or already is
118
It is important to assess whether such discrimination
occurring.
is in fact taking place. Aside from preventing discrimination in the
event that it is occurring, protective legislation could help allay
people’s fears even if it is not occurring.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 74.
E.g., Hellman, supra note 30.
See 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2000).
Geller et al., supra note 56, at 247; Lapham et al., supra note 56, at 621.
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